Poland barely had time to reopen two border crossings with Belarus when it immediately faced sabotage on its railways. Was this the work of Moscow, or foreign-policy schizophrenia in Minsk? Or perhaps both?
In the night of 17 November, Poland opened the Kuznica–Bialystok and Bobrowniki checkpoints. This is an important development for many Belarusians. Even with some restrictions, the iron curtain between our country and the EU became less dense, making it easier to cross the border. And it seems not everyone is happy about that.
On 18 November, Poland’s Prime Minister Donald Tusk told the Sejm about progress in the investigation of two acts of sabotage on Poland’s railways. According to charges brought by the National Prosecutor’s Office, these were “acts of sabotage of a terrorist nature” committed “between 15 and 17 November.” In the first case, a steel clamp had been placed on the tracks, which could have caused a train crash. In the second, an explosive device of military origin was detonated. Both incidents, fortunately, resulted in no serious consequences. And both occurred on the Warsaw–Lublin railway line, which is used, among other things, to transport cargo destined for Ukraine in its defence against Russian aggression. Poland’s Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski called what happened not “sabotage,” but “state terrorism.”
Tusk stressed that the incidents were the most serious security breach since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. According to the prime minister, Polish security services have identified suspects. The sabotage, it is claimed, involved two Ukrainian citizens — Alyaksandr K. and Yevhen I. — who had “long cooperated with Russian intelligence services.” But the saboteurs managed to cross into Belarus before Polish law enforcement reached them.
As a result, there are now three components: newly opened border crossings, acts of sabotage, and suspects who fled to Belarus. Tellingly, Warsaw does not expect much cooperation from Minsk in extraditing them. Yesterday, Sikorski confirmed that appropriate diplomatic steps would be taken. At the same time, the minister noted: “Procedures must be followed, but you know what the chances are.”
Sikorski recalled that the Belarusian regime still has not extradited to Poland the migrant who fatally wounded Polish soldier Mateusz Sitek. According to the minister, this issue is raised at every contact with the Belarusian side.
This is not Poland’s only demand. Journalist and activist of the Union of Poles of Belarus Andzhey Poczobut and other Polish citizens detained on politically motivated charges remain behind bars.
Today’s release of two Catholic priests could, if one wished, be framed as a concession to Poland — were it not for Minsk’s separate long-running track of engagement with the Vatican.
The issue of migrant instrumentalisation also remains unresolved: on the one hand, the number of attempted illegal crossings from Belarus has sharply declined. In recent days, the border services of Poland, Lithuania and Latvia have not registered a single attempt to cross from Belarus. On the other hand, this trend may be due to deteriorating weather conditions rather than Minsk’s willingness to compromise. It was, after all, the migrant crisis engineered by the regime that led to the closure of one of the newly reopened crossings on the Belarus–Poland border. The other was closed after Poczobut’s sentencing.
Ahead of the reopening, Tusk said this was an independent decision of the Polish government, unrelated to any political talks with the Lukashenka regime. At the same time, he admitted that efforts to secure the release of Poczobut and other Poles imprisoned in Belarus had not yet succeeded.
It may turn out that the prime minister’s words about the absence of negotiations were a diplomatic manoeuvre. And that certain arrangements with Minsk were indeed reached before the border crossings reopened — with both sides needing to keep a pause so that the eastern neighbour could “save face.” But instead of gratitude from Minsk, Poland received two acts of sabotage and perpetrators who fled to Belarus, with little prospect of extradition.
Polish security services continue to detain suspects, so more details may soon emerge. But Poland’s authorities have no illusions about who ordered the sabotage. Sikorski announced that, in response, the Foreign Ministry would withdraw consent for the operation of the Russian consulate in Gdańsk. It might have happened anyway, but the question is how long Poland will tolerate this — or whether it will decide that “jeden pies,” Moscow or Minsk, it makes no difference, and simply close the border again.
The Belarusian regime, of course, presents the reopening of two border crossings with Poland and the early reopening of the border with Lithuania as an unprecedented achievement of its own. An open border is important for the regime too, as it provides opportunities to earn money — both legally and otherwise. On the issue of open borders, the interests of the regime and citizens coincide in a rare way. And sabotaging itself at such a crucial moment by participating in acts of sabotage on Polish railways is something the regime would hardly choose to do if it were thinking rationally.
It is obvious there is another force whose interests are the opposite. A force interested in maintaining the thickest possible iron curtain separating Belarus from the West. One that wants the Belarusian regime to have as little room for manoeuvre as possible. That force is the Kremlin, which is perfectly capable of activating its agents-saboteurs at just the right moment — when the borders reopen. And, by ordering them to flee to Belarus afterward, tarnish its ally in the process. To keep him in line. Everything happened just too conveniently to look like a coincidence.
But should we again “resurrect Makei” and absolve the poor, helpless Lukashenka, who is supposedly “unable to resist” Moscow’s pressure and constantly needs new concessions to save Belarus?
I would suggest the situation is more layered. Lukashenka may have a direct interest in simultaneously improving and worsening relations with EU neighbours.
It is more likely that the Belarusian leader is playing his political chess game on two (or three?) boards at once. And the goal is not to grant ordinary Belarusians slightly more freedom of movement. The main objective is to maximise profit and preserve power. Within this logic, a simultaneous attempt to improve relations with Poland (for example, through Poczobut’s release) while facilitating acts of sabotage is not schizophrenia at all, but the strategy of a calculating actor trying to extract maximum benefit from every direction. The more concessions Poland and Lithuania make, the more provocations Minsk can offer the Kremlin — or the more financial support it can demand.
Those familiar with Belarus’s modern history will find nothing new in this: such foreign-policy schizophrenia has been Lukashenka’s trademark throughout his rule. Only now, because of the war, the stakes are higher.
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The author’s views and assessments do not necessarily reflect those of Reform.news.