Иллюстративное изображение сгенерировано с помощью ИИ
According to Wirtualna Polska, one of the components of the deal reportedly being prepared between Minsk and Washington could be supplies of oil from Venezuela and Azerbaijan to Belarusian refineries. Such a plan could indeed be of interest to both the US administration and the Belarusian regime. But there is still something troubling about the publication.
Based on conversations with unnamed sources in Poland and countries in the region, Wirtualna Polska journalist Zbigniew Parafianowicz writes that after a meeting between Aliaksandr Lukashenka and Donald Trump, which is supposed to take place in the United States at a “Peace Summit,” “oil from the United States” will begin flowing to Belarus. In reality, the crude would be American in name only — under that label, supplies of Venezuelan and Azerbaijani oil would be sent to our country.
Wirtualna Polska reports that this oil is to be processed at Belarusian refineries and sold on European markets. The price is expected to be attractive for Lukashenka, while American companies could act as intermediaries in fuel sales.
Oil from Venezuela is supposed to arrive via the Baltic Sea. To ensure these supplies, Parafianowicz writes, Lithuania and Latvia have already been brought into the negotiation process and are expected to provide their ports for transit. We would add that recent statements by US presidential special envoy John Coale expressing hope for the start of dialogue between Vilnius and Minsk may indirectly indicate that Washington is indeed seeking to influence the position of these countries’ leadership.
Oil from Azerbaijan would allegedly be transferred through the Druzhba pipeline system on a swap basis. Formally, Azerbaijan would sell oil to Belarus, but in practice Belarusian refineries would receive Russian crude accounted for as Azerbaijani. At the same time, citing a certain source in Ukrainian diplomacy, the article claims that Kyiv was “sounded out” on the issue of using the port of Odesa. And, supposedly, no categorical “no” regarding a reset with Belarus was voiced by the Ukrainian capital.
According to Parafianowicz, by arranging such supplies the United States would be solving several tasks at once. First, Venezuelan and Azerbaijani oil would help reduce Lukashenka’s dependence on Russia. Second, it would be a good opportunity to show Vladimir Putin that Washington is influential, capable of bringing rogue states out from under sanctions and returning them to the international system in exchange for concessions. Third, it would increase fuel supply on the market thanks to crude not originating from the war-stricken Persian Gulf, thereby lowering prices.
It sounds logical, although the supply plan appears designed for a longer-term perspective than the duration of military action against Iran announced by Trump. On the other hand, as long as the war continues, it is difficult to say when oil supplies from the Gulf region will fully recover, even if hostilities cease.
But there are other components that may be of interest to the US administration. After the capture of Nicolás Maduro, Washington effectively took control of sales of Venezuelan oil. That means the United States has gained access to a huge reserve of heavy crude that needs to be profitably placed somewhere. In the case of Belarus, an opportunity emerges to redirect crude that previously went to China or Cuba under preferential arrangements to markets where it could bring real money and political concessions.
The economic rationale for supplying Venezuelan oil to Belarus has always remained questionable because of the distance and logistical difficulties. In 2010–2012, at the height of another energy conflict with Russia, Belarus overpaid hundreds of millions of dollars for Venezuelan oil. However, today, given US geopolitical goals and Russia’s tax manoeuvre, logistics may no longer be such a significant factor.
In connection with Venezuela, the United States may also have other interests in Belarus. Official Minsk has accumulated substantial debt to that country for past oil supplies. Since Venezuela’s financial flows are now controlled by the United States, the issue of recovering these funds or converting them into assets, such as stakes in Belarusian enterprises, could be of interest to Washington. Or there could be interest in involving Belorusneft in restoring Venezuelan oil infrastructure.
With supplies from Azerbaijan, things are even simpler. Swap deals with Baku are partly beneficial for Russia as well, as it is experiencing difficulties with oil exports. And if Ukraine could be persuaded to pump oil to Belarus via the Odesa–Brody pipeline, the price of supplies would be even more attractive.
Nor should we forget the political lever — oil as a reward for certain further steps toward the West.
So it cannot be ruled out that the United States may have an interest in oil supplies to Belarus. Just as official Minsk may.
Now is the right time to quote Belarus’s suddenly deceased foreign minister Uladzimir Makei: “Taught by the bitter experience of various economic crises, we came to the conclusion that diversification is a vital principle. The head of the Belarusian state has set the corresponding task of ensuring that about 30 percent of oil supplies come from alternative sources,” he said in June 2020.
According to the minister, Belneftekhim, the Foreign Ministry and other relevant agencies were at that time working on Lukashenka’s instruction to secure around 30 percent of oil volumes from alternative sources. It was then, following the agreements reached during the visit of Secretary of State Michael Pompeo to Minsk, that the United States began supplying oil to Belarus.
We remember what happened next in 2020. Diversification collapsed, and Minsk ended up totally dependent on Moscow.
A little more than a year ago, speaking at Russia’s Federation Council, Lukashenka complained about the lack of profitability at Belarusian refineries. According to him, this was linked to oil prices. The politician asked the Russians for at least “7–8 percent profitability.”
Judging by everything, those figures have been achieved. At the end of last year, Lukashenka’s chief of staff Dzmitry Krutoi said that Belarusian refineries had begun processing Russian tolling crude and returned to profitable operations in the fourth quarter. At the same time, he said, “we are absolutely not living lavishly.” The “golden times” of Belarus’s oil refining sector, driven by cheap Russian crude and exports of petroleum products to the West, are a thing of the past.
Today Belarusian refineries operate on Russian oil. In return, fuel is supplied to Russia, which has faced shortages of petrol and diesel because Ukrainians have bombed many Russian oil refineries. Belarus receives payments from Russia compensating for the tax manoeuvre. But if Russia restores its refining volumes, where is Minsk supposed to send petroleum products that are no longer in demand? Under the REPowerEU roadmap, the EU had intended to stop importing Russian gas and oil by the end of 2027. The relevant draft law was postponed in recent days, primarily because of rising fuel prices caused by the war in the Middle East. A ban on supplies of products made from Russian oil in third countries was also discussed. But Brussels may return to its original plans as the situation on the oil market stabilises.
Whichever way one looks at it, diversification would be very timely for Minsk. So the Belarusian regime has a direct interest in such a deal. It would seem that interests coincide with those of the United States, and so the version proposed by Wirtualna Polska could be seen as workable.
And yet there is still something troubling about this article.
First and foremost, the publication date: April 1. April Fool’s Day is widely observed in many countries, so it would be rash to completely dismiss the possibility that Wirtualna Polska and Mr Parafianowicz were trying to launch a hoax and fool their readers and others. It would have been enough to take as a basis the memorable 2019 plan of US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and National Security Adviser John Bolton and “overlay” it onto present-day realities.
So far there has been no visible reaction from Polish, Lithuanian or Ukrainian politicians and media to Parafianowicz’s version. Perhaps they, too, noticed the date on the calendar and decided to wait.
But even if the version described is not a prank, the references to certain Ukrainian sources allegedly familiar with the backstage details also raise questions. Why did they decide to speak specifically to Wirtualna Polska? And what was the purpose of the leak? The range of probabilities here is extremely broad. Perhaps what was said is in fact true. Or perhaps it is a tool for launching disinformation. Kyiv is capable of playing its own game by spreading various kinds of information leaks.
Finally, let us not forget that for the described scheme to be implemented, EU sanctions on Belarusian petroleum products and their producers would have to be lifted. Only in that case would access to European markets be possible. And only then could Lukashenka feel somewhat freer in relations with Moscow and make money from fuel supplies to Europe.
So, despite Washington’s and Minsk’s likely interest in such an oil deal, it is still too early to draw far-reaching conclusions. Although overall, the scheme described is by no means devoid of logic. And if the publication does turn out to be a prank, it deserves a high mark for creativity.
***
The author’s opinions and assessments may not coincide with the position of the Reform.news editorial board