Фото: Офис Светланы Тихановской
Will Yermak’s Resignation Change Kyiv’s Approach Toward the Belarusian Democratic Movement?
One of the most important recent events in Ukrainian politics, and in the region as a whole, has been the resignation of the Head of the Office of President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, Andriy Yermak. We will try to look at this development from a less obvious angle: could this resignation lead to changes in how Ukraine’s leadership approaches the Belarusian democratic movement?
“The Grey Cardinal”
Andriy Yermak fell victim to “Mindychgate,” one of the largest corruption scandals in Ukraine, linked to a massive kickback scheme in the energy sector. According to law enforcement authorities, the criminal group was led by Israeli citizen Timur Mindych, co-owner of the Kvartal-95 studio and a close friend of President Zelenskyy. Several other high-ranking Ukrainian officials have also been named as suspects in the case.
Yermak was next. On November 28, it became known that the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) and the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO) had conducted searches at the head of the President’s Office. That same evening, Yermak, who had been described as an “all-powerful presidential favorite”, submitted his resignation.
The BBC wrote that Yermak was “often referred to behind his back as the country’s vice president. This was reflected, among other things, in the appointment of people loyal to him to key positions.” The outlet also noted that “even while serving as a presidential aide, Yermak concentrated almost the entire sphere of foreign policy activity in his hands.”
This suggests that the “grey cardinal” Yermak and his appointees may also have shaped attitudes toward the Belarusian democratic movement and some of its leaders.
Keeping at a Distance
The position of official Kyiv toward the Belarusian democratic forces in general, and toward Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya in particular, has been and remains cool. Suffice it to say that President Zelenskyy, unlike the leaders of many democratic states, has never held an official meeting with Tsikhanouskaya.
In the summer of 2021, the Belarusian politician said that her office was “of course in contact with representatives of the Ukrainian government.” She herself “once met online with Mr. Dmytro Kuleba (Ukraine’s foreign minister in 2020–2024 — editor’s note), and crossed paths with Mr. Zelenskyy at an event in Lithuania. We have not had official meetings, but you know how strongly we feel Ukraine’s support.”
No official meetings took place later either. Tsikhanouskaya and Zelenskyy only exchanged handshakes at events they both attended. Beyond fleeting greetings, the matter did not progress. Her call on the Ukrainian president to form an alliance with a democratic Belarus remained unanswered.
This does not mean that there were no contacts at all. Adviser to the Head of the Office of the President of Ukraine Mykhailo Podoliak met with Valery Kavaleuski, who at the time served as the Representative of the United Transitional Cabinet for Foreign Affairs, as well as with Tsikhanouskaya’s adviser on constitutional reform and parliamentary cooperation Anatol Lyabedzka. But that was the limit; at higher levels, official Kyiv avoided contacts.
Ukrainian spokespersons attempted to explain Kyiv’s demonstrative distancing from the leader of the Belarusian democratic forces. For example, Podoliak stated that the Belarusian opposition was not showing sufficient anti-war activity. Meanwhile, Alyaksandr Lukashenka, in his view, understood how the war was developing.
The figure of Podoliak himself is noteworthy. In the 1990s and early 2000s, he worked as a journalist for several Belarusian independent outlets. He joined the Office of the President of Ukraine following Yermak in April 2020. Theoretically, he could have maintained connections in Belarus and, as Yermak’s adviser, influenced processes. Judging by the outcome, not in favor of Tsikhanouskaya and her office.
Oleksii Arestovych, who also served at the time as an adviser to the head of the President’s Office, suggested that “if President Zelenskyy meets with Tsikhanouskaya, Alyaksandr Hryhoravich could react very sharply and nervously on a personal level.” According to Arestovych, “there are also economic ties; the art of strategy lies in making moves on the chessboard of life that expand the space of possibilities.” Such a meeting, he said, would only “reduce Ukraine’s room for maneuver.”
It appears that the principle of “not angering the old man” became entrenched in Ukrainian policy long before it emerged among some Belarusian democratic activists. Arestovych’s remark about “economic ties” also sounded strange, given that he made this comment to Euroradio at the end of April 2022 — two months after the war began and after Russia invaded Ukraine from Belarusian territory. Was this a slip of the tongue, or something more?
“Wagner Fighters” Near Minsk
At least one episode directly involving Belarus is closely linked to Yermak. In July 2020, members of the Belarusian KGB’s Group A, with OMON support, detained more than 30 Wagner private military company fighters at a sanatorium near Minsk. It later emerged that the mercenaries had arrived in Belarus as part of a Ukrainian special operation. The SBU officer overseeing it, Colonel Roman Chervinskyi, said the goal was to capture Wagner fighters who had taken part in hostilities against Ukraine and transfer them to Kyiv to face charges.
The plan was reportedly for the fighters to fly from Minsk to Istanbul. Once the plane entered Ukrainian airspace, it would be forced to land and the Wagner fighters would be arrested.
It is alleged that Yermak demanded the operation be canceled, supposedly to avoid jeopardizing the ceasefire in Donbas that Moscow and Kyiv had just agreed upon. Yermak later claimed that “Lukashenka did indeed consider the possibility of extraditing the people brought there from Russia, which unfortunately did not happen.” According to the former head of Zelenskyy’s office, the problem was that “there was no document necessary for the extradition of the criminals, and therefore for their arrest in Ukraine.” Yermak described the plan to seize the Wagner fighters as “a pure adventure,” not coordinated with President Zelenskyy.
Chervinskyi, for his part, stated that the head of Ukraine’s military intelligence, Kyrylo Budanov, threatened him and the officers who organized the operation and “attempted to cover up traces of this operation on Yermak’s instructions.”
In the end, the Wagner mercenaries detained in Belarus were returned to Russia. It is a strange story that raises a pointed question: in whose interests were the participants acting?
Energy Once Again
In 2021, Ukraine was hit by another corruption scandal. The moratorium on electricity imports from Belarus was lifted, and instead of the state-owned Energoatom, supplies were routed through the private firm TET Group. Ukrainian media reported that the scheme involved a shell company allegedly linked to another politician close to Zelenskyy, the head of the Servant of the People parliamentary faction, Davyd Arakhamia.
The scheme was described as follows: Energoatom was supposed to import electricity from Belarus and even paid 600 million hryvnias for access to the Belarusian power grid. However, it was never allowed to import. The Belarusian state concern Belenergo allegedly refused to sell electricity to Energoatom. Instead, the Ukrainian state company was replaced by Vector Energy Innovation from the UAE. This company then resold electricity to two Ukrainian firms, TET Group and Elektropostachalnyk, with TET receiving vastly larger volumes. It was TET that was linked in Ukraine to Arakhamia.
Belenergo reportedly sold electricity to Vector Energy Innovation at USD 59 per MWh. Under the contract between Vector Energy Innovation and TET Group LLC, the Emirati company resold it at USD 100 per MWh. Regardless of market conditions and supply volumes, Vector Energy Innovation thus earned a stable USD 41 per MWh. With declared monthly imports from Belarus of around 900,000 MWh, the sum was far from astronomical but still substantial.
What interests us most in this scheme is Vector Energy Innovation from the UAE. Investigators from BelPol found its connection to Vector Capital Group, which the Belarusian Investigative Center describes as part of the shadow business empire of Lukashenka’s longtime associate Viktar Sheiman.
Is this an example of the very “economic ties” Arestovych once let slip? It appears that the beneficiaries of this scheme existed on both sides of the border.
More Than We Can Imagine?
Shortly after Mindychgate, Lukashenka commented on the corruption scandal in Ukraine. His remarks sounded oddly mild. There were no curses or condemnations. “As if there had never been corruption in Ukraine, as if they had not stolen more there than in the whole country. Recently it was USD 100 million. Trump says they gave Ukraine USD 300 billion. What is USD 100 million out of USD 300 billion? Nothing,” he said.
As if nothing serious had happened. It gives the impression that Lukashenka is well informed about the scale of corruption among his neighbors and not surprised at all. Perhaps he even knows much more than some in Ukraine would like. Could this knowledge underpin Kyiv’s current approach of “not angering the old man”?
The information presented is insufficient for firm conclusions, but sufficient to advance hypotheses. This version, at the very least, looks more convincing than earlier explanations offered by Ukrainian spokespersons.
Yermak’s departure and the inevitable reshuffles could gradually replace the former head of Zelenskyy’s office’s powerful entourage with new figures. These figures may no longer be constrained by the old concept, and the need to “avoid angering the old man” may no longer inspire fear. At some point, their perspective could become the majority view.
It cannot be ruled out that Belarusian democratic forces may then gain a new opportunity to establish more constructive relations with Ukraine’s leadership. The old ballast would no longer drag them down.
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The opinions and assessments expressed by the author may not coincide with the position of the Reform.news editorial team.