Фото: Ilse Driessen / Unsplash.com
Experts from the Green Belarus Alliance previously warned about a fatal vulnerability in the country’s energy system.
In the first two days of 2026, there have been no reports of a new contract being signed for the supply of natural gas from Russia to Belarus. Meanwhile, the previous three-year agreement, which fixed the price at $128.5 per 1,000 cubic meters, expired on December 31, 2025.
Earlier, the two sides said they were on the “final stretch” toward signing a new agreement. However, no official announcement of a signing has been made.
Throughout December 2025, senior officials, including Head of the Presidential Administration Dzmitry Krutoy and Energy Minister Dzianis Maroz, confirmed that work on the new document was proceeding intensively. Traditionally, such strategic issues in relations between Minsk and Moscow are resolved at the presidential level in the final days of the year.
What is known about Belarus’s position on the new contract? First, Minsk was expecting prices to converge with domestic Russian levels. Belarus’s key demand is to bring the gas price as close as possible to Russia’s internal prices, specifically the level in Smolensk Region. This is necessary for the operation of a unified electricity market.
Second, Belarus wants to continue paying for gas in Russian rubles, as has been the case since April 2022. And third, Minsk seeks to sign not a short-term but a long-term contract, for five years until 2030, in order to ensure predictability for the economy.
However, the key parameter — the supply price — has not been disclosed. Even an approximate price corridor is unknown.
Previously, experts from the Green Belarus Alliance conducted a large-scale study of the national energy system, analyzing its resilience to external and internal shocks. The findings paint an alarming picture: behind the façade of “union integration” lies total vulnerability that an “active initiator” of a crisis could exploit.
About 60% of all electricity in Belarus is generated from gas, which accounts for roughly 80% of production costs. As a result, electricity prices are highly sensitive to changes in gas prices. In heat production, the dependence is even greater.
Calculations by experts from the Green Belarus Alliance show that, from a technical standpoint, Belarus could be supplied with gas from alternative sources via deliveries through EU countries.
“The problems lie in the economic sphere — a sharp increase in gas prices — and today also in the political sphere of relations between Belarus and EU countries. However, this area lies outside our expert field, and we do not undertake to model or predict political developments,” the experts say.
Belarus’s energy sector was historically built as part of the large Soviet system, and this umbilical cord has never been cut. The fundamental problem lies in the structure of resource consumption. The country’s main fuels are natural gas and oil. Domestic oil production amounts to about 2 million tonnes per year, covering only a quarter of internal demand. There is no targeted production of natural gas at all, with only associated gas from oil extraction being used.
The bottom line is a situation of absolute import dependence. The entire volume of gas and the lion’s share of oil are supplied from the Russian Federation. Russia is the sole supplier not only for economic reasons but also because of technological dependence built into the infrastructure. Even coal, used in small quantities, is entirely Russian.
Experts stress that such a system architecture creates ideal conditions for blackmail. From Belarus’s perspective as a consumer, there is no difference between a “technical accident” on a gas pipeline and a political decision to shut off the valve — the outcome for the economy and the population would be equally devastating.
During the study, analysts applied a risk assessment methodology that takes into account the probability of an event, system vulnerability, and the scale of potential losses. A ranking of the 10 main threats, or shocks, to Belarus’s energy sector was compiled.
The top two positions in this anti-ranking, by a wide margin with 18 risk points, are a halt or restriction of supplies through gas and oil pipelines from Russia. This is the scenario of the most severe energy crises for the Belarusian economy. Third place, with 9 points, is occupied by a shutdown of power grids. The threat of a blackout is not hypothetical: experts recall the consequences of the summer 2024 storm in the Mazyr district, when the elements clearly demonstrated the fragility of local networks.
Fourth on the list of threats is an internal financial shock — the cessation of subsidies for boiler houses, rated at 8 points. This is the hidden threat rarely discussed from high podiums but one that affects every Belarusian who receives a monthly utility bill.
Natural gas is the circulatory system of Belarus’s energy sector. It is the main fuel for producing both heat and electricity. If oil, in the form of diesel, powers transport and electricity fuels industry, gas heats homes and ensures the operation of power plants.
Researchers modeled a situation in which Minsk would have to seek an alternative to Russian gas. Technically, this is possible, for example by using the Yamal–Europe gas pipeline in reverse mode. However, the price of such independence would be enormous. Switching to gas purchases at European spot prices would reveal the true cost of “integration.”
The energy crisis of 2022–2024 in Europe has passed, and prices have normalized and nearly returned to 2018 levels. However, they remain significantly higher than the price at which Belarus purchased gas from Russia. Comparing EU spot prices with Russian gas prices in 2025 shows a difference of $200 per 1,000 cubic meters, translating into additional annual costs of about $3.5 billion.
The situation with oil is different. After Russia implemented its tax maneuver, oil prices for Belarus have largely aligned with global prices. Therefore, experts consider a shock from rising oil prices, rated at 6 risk points, to be less dangerous, as the economy has already adapted to high prices. The main threat here remains a physical restriction of transit volumes.
The study pays particular attention to internal vulnerabilities, especially the centralized heating system. As of June 2025, Belarus’s population pays 27.23 rubles per gigacalorie of heat, while the economically justified tariff is 134.94 rubles.
The level of subsidization reaches 80%. This gap is covered through cross-subsidization, with higher tariffs for enterprises, and direct budget injections. Experts warn that in the event of a serious economic crisis and a reduction in budget support, district boiler houses without industrial consumers would be the first to be hit.
The cessation of subsidies is a risk rated at 8 points. On a national scale, this could mean either the bankruptcy of utility enterprises or a one-time increase in heating bills by four to five times, inevitably leading to a social explosion. The total volume of subsidies for households for boiler houses alone is estimated at about $305 million per year.
“The country’s energy security today is a fiction,” experts from the Green Belarus Alliance say. “High dependence on supplies from Russia, both oil and gas, makes the system extremely vulnerable to external shocks. While oil prices are no longer the main lever of pressure, the gas pipeline remains a powerful instrument of political coercion.”
According to them, strengthening Belarus’s energy resilience requires not cosmetic repairs but fundamental political decisions aimed at reducing dependence and increasing transparency in the sector.
“Otherwise, Belarus risks meeting any serious geopolitical storm in darkness and cold, becoming a hostage to its own short-sighted strategy of ‘cheap resources’ in exchange for sovereignty.”
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The author’s opinions and assessments may not coincide with those of the Reform.news editorial board.