Михаил Подоляк. Фото: Centrumeuropy.pl
Adviser to the head of Zelenskyy’s Office Mykhailo Podolyak is a controversial figure in Ukrainian politics. From 1989 to 2004, he lived in Belarus, worked as a journalist and was deported to Ukraine at the request of the KGB. Before his deportation, he accused Lukashenka of “slowing down the development of Russian-Belarusian economic cooperation.” He is now one of the main spokespeople for the Ukrainian authorities in the information war against Russia. He has been described as one of the people promoting in Yermak’s circle the idea of “not angering the old man” and spoke of Tsikhanouskaya’s “pro-Russian stance.”
Yesterday, the Polish outlet Centrumeuropy.pl published an interview with Mykhailo Podolyak, focused mainly on the visit of Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya to Kyiv. The representative of the Ukrainian president’s office shared several key thoughts on Belarusian-Ukrainian relations. We offer the full translation of the interview:
— What is happening in Belarus right now? We see troop movements, exercises, the closure of the border zone. Does this really indicate some kind of threat, or are these more attempts to imitate aggression?
— Both yes and no. This can be viewed as attempts at escalation, raising the stakes to show: “Look, we can expand the front line to northern Ukraine, we can put pressure on Europe.” Especially since Belarus periodically provokes Poland and the Baltic states, and there is the issue of the Suwałki corridor, and so on. In other words, this is an attempt to increase negotiating leverage against the backdrop of the stagnation Russia is currently experiencing on the front line.
But on the other hand — and President Zelenskyy, Commander-in-Chief General Syrskyi and our intelligence services have spoken about this — we see many logistical activities in Belarus around a potential Northern Front. The aim is to stretch Ukraine’s defensive forces. That does pose certain threats. The question is different — for me it remains a mystery why this is happening… First of all, we have already built a line of defense there, and there are enough [Ukrainian] forces stationed there, so there will be no need to redeploy them from the front line.
Secondly, the territory of Belarus is now completely within range of strikes. […] There are important targets there that would be destroyed immediately. And Lukashenka — a man who has called himself president for 32 years — should understand this. The question is whether he has retained any agency — probably not. Even in relations with the Russian Federation. That is why we are preparing, if necessary, to carry out a defensive counterattack quite quickly.
But will Belarus be drawn into the war? I have one small remark here. For Russia, the concept of war is completely normal. They are immersed in war. For them, the most important thing is the destruction of neighbors. They do not want a good life for themselves; they prefer to go somewhere else to rob others. They applauded when they invaded Ukraine. Seventy to eighty percent [of Russians] were thrilled that they could enter Ukrainian territory, a large country, to steal, kill, rape and so on.
In Belarus, however, the concept of life is different. I understand that there are many assimilated Russians there, but overall Belarusians are moderate people, they are definitely not in favor of war. They do not want aggression. And this is not their war. We explain this in different places: even despite your [Belarusian] alliance with Russia, this is not your war. You still have to find a way to stay out of it. Therefore, I still believe that [on this issue] pressure from Belarusians on Lukashenka will be enormous.
— From our Polish perspective, when we see what Lukashenka is doing now, it creates the impression that some kind of schizophrenia reigns there. Because on the one hand, he released Andrzej Poczobut and political prisoners. There is movement at the border — recently things have been relatively calm on the Polish-Belarusian border, but contraband balloons are still flying into Lithuania. We cannot really understand Lukashenka’s intentions. He is trying to improve relations with Donald Trump. At the same time, various strange ideas appear — for example, transporting oil to Belarus through Ukraine.
— It is simple. First of all, when you stay in power for so long, such schizophrenia is bound to arise, because you begin to think you are a tsar. Secondly, as I already said, Lukashenka is not fully independent; everything there is permeated by Russian special services, they control his inner circle, they control almost all business. And thirdly, I still do not see U.S.-Belarus negotiations as something that could increase Belarus’s inclination toward respecting human rights or anything of that sort.
The United States wants to gain access to Belaruskali [the Belarusian potash producer], to enter business there, nothing more. It is good that many political prisoners can be released in the process, but even more remain in prison. […] And finally, the most important thing: Belarus, unfortunately, is not an independent state. It would like to have such a status and eventually will, but today [Belarusians] are completely dependent on the militarization imposed on them by the Russian Federation.
And for Russia, Belarus is, on the one hand, a tool for pressuring Europe through meteorological balloons, drones and so on, as well as migrants crossing the border there. On the other hand, it is a permanent way to keep Ukraine on alert. Under the slogan: “Look, the Northern Front can always appear.”
Why should Lukashenka come to his senses a little here? Because [in Belarus] there has already been an attempt to create control stations for [Russian] drones flying over Western Ukraine. And we will destroy them. President Zelenskyy spoke about this directly. […] As for nuclear weapons, the exercises being held, the transfer of the Topol missile or Oreshnik (as Putin calls the modified Topol), other missiles, Iskanders capable of carrying nuclear warheads and so on — this is only rhetoric, it is merely about raising the stakes. They think you should fear them. But after four years of war in Ukraine — what is there to fear?
— Do you have any communication channels with Lukashenka? To convey something to him?
— Only public ones. Because there is no point in speaking informally with people who do not keep their word, are not independent, do not bear responsibility for their behavior and are susceptible to the manic tendencies of people like Putin. […]. Even if you formally agree on something with them, they will violate it anyway. And if it is informal, then he [Lukashenka] will say he knew nothing about it.
— And the Belarusian opposition? Warsaw is one of the main, if not the main, centers of the Belarusian political diaspora. There is Vilnius, there is Warsaw. But Kyiv, despite the fact that you have the Kastuś Kalinouski Regiment — it is fighting on your side, defending Ukraine — rather cautiously supports the Belarusian opposition.
— And it does so excellently. Both the Freedom of Russia Legion and the Russian Volunteer Corps, as well as the Kastuś Kalinouski Regiment, have proven that not all Russians and Belarusians are like Putin and everyone else. By shedding their blood, they are saying that those who are normal should get a chance. Belarusians are proving this.
— But Kyiv somehow has not become a third center for this Belarusian opposition… I have the impression, and many people tell me this, that you are still cautious toward Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya and the Belarusian opposition.
— Not exactly. We really are cautious. Because at the beginning of the war, a large number of Russian criminals invaded from Belarusian territory, and they later killed girls and children in the Kyiv region. It is known that they used Belarus as a staging ground. Lukashenka then said he did not know they would go [into Ukraine]. What nonsense! So of course the attitude toward the overall image of Belarus is exactly like that. Nevertheless, we do have certain communication with representatives of the opposition.
Recently, I have had many such contacts, including with Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya. The president of Ukraine met with her. I think we will gradually build these relations. But traditionally, the offices of the Belarusian opposition were located either in Vilnius or Warsaw. […] Meanwhile, communication with the Belarusian opposition today is completely different. It is constructive, promising. I think we will be able to build a third center of the Belarusian opposition.
— Perhaps Warsaw, Kyiv and Vilnius should somehow jointly coordinate policy toward Belarus?
— Quite possibly. We have a representative for Belarusian affairs. You probably have such people, Lithuania does as well. I think they will coordinate this work. Overall, it is a good idea. I believe Belarusians need help.
Once again, I want to stress: I have a completely different attitude toward Belarus than toward Russia. In Russia, the only thing that can [help us] is the disintegration of that country and its reformatting into ethnic entities. I believe there should be fully independent states in the Caucasus, for example Ichkeria [Chechnya]. Russia will also have to atone there. For mass killings in Dagestan and elsewhere. I view Belarus in a completely different way. It is an absolutely pro-European, calm country that can raise the status of Eastern Europe and give it new opportunities. Belarus itself deserves this. Not Lukashenka. Lukashenka is not Belarusian, he is some kind of strange figure.
In the novel “The Yawning Heights” by the Soviet émigré writer [Aleksandr] Zinoviev, there appears the concept of homo sovieticus. That is exactly what Lukashenka is. A man “without kin or tribe,” without territory — it does not matter to him [where to live]: the Yaroslavl region, Belarus and so on.
But the opposition must be engaged with. And we will engage. And, as I think, coordinate actions between Warsaw, Kyiv and Vilnius.
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Michał Kacewicz spoke in Kyiv with Mykhailo Podolyak, adviser to the head of the Office of the President of Ukraine, Kyrylo Budanov / centrumeuropy.pl