There may be many reasons for Belarusians to install the Russian messenger Max. First and foremost — communication with relatives and friends in Russia, as popular services such as WhatsApp and Telegram have been blocked by Roskomnadzor since early 2026. Some may have installed it out of curiosity, others out of fear of possible blocking of “hostile” messengers in Belarus as well. Few people consider the associated risks. Except for the Belarusian regime, for which the growing popularity of Max in the country could bring serious trouble.
The Russian messenger Max has 1.3 million users from Belarus, according to the service’s press office. If these figures are accurate, that amounts to roughly 15% of the country’s population, including children and the elderly.
Meanwhile, experts believe Max was created to strengthen control over Russian citizens. It was developed by VK’s subsidiary “Communication Platform” with the support and oversight of the Russian state. Notably, to gain access to Russia’s “Gosuslugi” digital platform, the developers met a number of requirements set by the FSB, which supervised the process. Russian security services have unrestricted access to the information shared by users in Max.
As DW was told by Leonid Yuldashev, project coordinator at eQualitie — a non-profit organisation developing technologies to enhance digital and social resilience — Max lacks end-to-end encryption, and all information, including message drafts, attachments, private and group chats, is accessible to administrators and law enforcement. Recent studies published on ntc.party and Habr also identified a spyware module in the Android version of Max. The messenger tracks VPN usage, checks access to blocked resources such as Telegram and WhatsApp, and transmits data to servers. This allows security structures and Roskomnadzor to build a comprehensive picture of how blocks are bypassed, monitor specific users and block VPN connections.
“MAX collects a vast amount of data about the user and the device on its servers. It examines device characteristics, contacts, lists of installed applications and gathers a wide range of other information,” says Stanislav Seleznev, head of the “Network Freedoms” project.
Max is not trusted even by Russian officials themselves. Faridaily reported that senior government officials, MPs and managers of state companies in Russia purchase special “clean” SIM cards and devices to install the messenger.
“Everyone believes that if you install Max on your phone, it’s the same as handing it over to the FSB,” a source close to the government told the outlet.
While Russians are being pushed into Max through incentives and pressure — up to threats of dismissal — Belarusians, whether voluntarily or out of necessity, are installing a spy messenger on their devices without any coercion.
And how many among them are civil servants, officials and others with access to information? Not necessarily state secrets, but information of great interest to the security services of a neighbouring country — about public sentiment in Belarus, dynamics within lower and mid-level authorities, backstage processes and more. Through Max, Russia’s FSB gains access to this and other data that Belarusians — both ordinary and not — may share in messages and voice communications.
The Belarusian regime has struggled to secure information sovereignty. Citizens are firmly entrenched on foreign platforms, whether Western ones like Facebook or Russian ones such as VKontakte and Odnoklassniki. There are both objective and subjective reasons for this. On the one hand, it is extremely difficult to create a successful project for a country of 9 million people. On the other, under conditions of repression, total censorship and the risk of business expropriation, few are willing to take on such a task. All independent, relatively popular projects capable of promoting a Belarusian agenda were effectively destroyed after the events of 2020. The vacuum was quickly filled by actors from Moscow.
Attempts by domestic propaganda to win over users on Russian platforms appear largely ineffective. On VKontakte, pages of Belarus 1, ONT and STV receive only a handful of likes and shares. On the RuTube video platform, view counts are minimal. Subscription numbers are also low: the main ONT account has 6,243 subscribers, STV has 2,008, and Belarus 1 has 4,798. Videos posted a month ago gather only a few hundred views at best. Unlike YouTube, there appears to be no artificial inflation of numbers, and the data likely reflects real audience interest.
The situation is no better — perhaps worse — on the domestic “first multimedia portal” Videobel, where view statistics are not disclosed at all.
The same applies to messengers. At one point, much was said about the domestic project Depesha, developed by a Hi-Tech Park resident company “Fox 3”. Initially intended exclusively for Belarusian state employees, it was later opened to the public. However, uptake has been minimal — the app currently has just over 10,000 downloads on Google Play, while on the App Store it lacks sufficient user ratings. Depesha has failed to gain traction. And now Max, with its leaks and ties to Russia’s FSB, adds further pressure.
Will the Belarusian regime simply watch as its larger neighbour closely monitors it? It is unclear how such information might be used. There are many “pressure points” that Russian security services could exploit based on private conversations and correspondence. Among more than a million users, there will inevitably be those who know something but are not careful with their words.
What options remain? Blocking Max domestically would likely provoke a negative reaction from Russia. The threat exists, and the regime is likely aware of it. For now, the wind is blowing from the east — but what if it changes, and the Kremlin decides to exert pressure on its ally?
There are no effective tools to counter this. Sovereignty, including information sovereignty, is easy to lose but far more difficult to regain.
All that remains is to watch as critical and less critical information flows into the hands of Russian security services. At most, authorities may quietly warn officials and those with access to sensitive information to avoid discussing such matters on the new messenger. And hope that independent media abroad will caution Belarusians against installing it unnecessarily — or at least urge maximum precautions if they do.
Well, we have done our part. The rest is up to those in high offices to draw their conclusions.
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The views and opinions expressed by the author may not reflect those of the Reform.news editorial team