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Alyaksandr Lukashenka has once again spoken in an interview with RT about a reform of state governance. What could the politician be seeking, why is he talking about it now, and who may have served as an example in reforming the system?
“I think about this a lot and have already consulted with some specialists on how to move forward. Looking ahead, I will say that we need to seriously think about governing the country. Perhaps we should even carry out a reform of state governance, using the experience of the old system, which Westerners advised us to fight against, especially your Americans”, Lukashenka said.
The politician then recalled Article 6 of the Soviet Constitution, which legally enshrined the monopoly of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on power, defining it as the “leading and guiding force” of society.
It appears that Lukashenka is seriously considering some kind of reform, as he also spoke about the need for changes in the state governance system at a recent meeting on the development of the Mahiliou region.
“We need to change the governance system and make it real. We talk about the need to mobilize today. And who is against mobilization? No one. Ask each of you. You will sincerely say yes, we need to mobilize while there is an information war rather than a hot war, just as we need to mobilize here with the fence, but there is no mobilization. Let us be frank, there is no mobilization mechanism. And in order to mobilize, there must be a system, and it must work. The Americans and Westerners taught us. There should be no parties, pluralism, and so on. They struck at the most sensitive points in order to destroy the country. Now we understand this. But how do we return to a situation where there is mobilization and a mobilizer? We need to think about it. Dzmitry Mikalayevich (addressing his chief of staff Dzmitry Krutoi – Reform.news note). <…> The district party committee, the district executive committee. It turns out there were fewer officials. There were fewer officials, while the population was twice as large then. <…> Therefore, the governance system must be changed. Perhaps we will return to that system to some extent. It was an effective system, and accountability was real, they demanded results properly”, the politician said.
How should these statements by Lukashenka be interpreted? Is he planning to recreate the Soviet system with a single “leading and guiding” party at the top? Concerns have also been voiced that in this way the politician is seeking to abolish universal elections, with the country’s leader to be elected, as in Soviet times, by the congress of that party or its governing body, by analogy with the Politburo of the Communist Party Central Committee.
Still, such a turn of events does not appear very likely. First, in a system of party dictatorship, Lukashenka himself would become largely dependent on the party. And sharing real power with anyone is clearly not part of his plans. Second, such a system would deprive him of the aura of “popular election” that the politician likes to invoke.
It should also not be forgotten that reform was already carried out just four years ago. The Constitution was amended, and the All-Belarusian People’s Assembly was given a new status. The politician did indeed say that perhaps the Assembly should be given the function of electing the head of state.
And yet this did not happen, although such a scenario apparently was discussed. The reason is the same as with the party — dependence, even on a body currently under control. Partly because of an unwillingness to share powers with the All-Belarusian People’s Assembly, the arrangement ultimately did not materialize. What emerged was a somewhat amorphous body that Lukashenka himself now does not seem to understand how to use.
To try to answer the question of what Lukashenka may be striving for, one must take into account his strategic goals. Let us assume there are at least two: preserving his own legacy after he leaves power and transferring authority to a successor, ideally by inheritance. At the same time, it is clear that the second is impossible without the first. Therefore, when speaking about some kind of reform of the system, the politician is proceeding from these assumptions.
Another detail should be noted, one that appears rather important — why Lukashenka is talking about the need to reform the state governance system right now. What exactly may have prompted him to think about the need for changes in the system?
The answer is fairly simple — the trigger was the war in Iran. More specifically, the fact that after the attack by the United States and Israel, the Iranian regime survived. Despite the deaths of a significant part of the country’s senior leadership, the system did not collapse. And it does not appear likely to collapse.
The cementing force that allowed the system to preserve itself in Iran was the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, created to defend the Islamic revolution and its achievements. After the start of military action by the United States and Israel, the IRGC effectively took over the governance of the country. Its influence over processes is now regarded as decisive. In Iran’s economy, the deeply corrupt IRGC also occupies a dominant position, controlling, among other things, oil exports. According to the most conservative estimates, the Corps’ share of Iran’s GDP amounts to at least 25%, while the Iranian opposition says it is 70%.
Who else would defend itself and the achievements of the Islamic regime so uncompromisingly? In essence, it is the IRGC that keeps the system standing. That is precisely why the Corps was created, and why it has been generously fed for years.
Perhaps it is precisely about creating a structure modeled on the IRGC that Lukashenka has begun to think. When he mentions the Soviet Union and district party committees, he is essentially talking about a system of overseers. An additional vertical with broad powers that permeates the entire system from top to bottom.
A structure that, while remaining separate from both the military and civilian authorities, controls both the security services and the civilian bureaucracy, ensuring their loyalty. A kind of commissioner corps safeguarding Lukashenka’s legacy. Naturally, entry into this “order” would only be possible by proving personal loyalty.
Occupying a higher position in the hierarchy than civilian and military leaders, members of this “order” could also serve as “mobilizers”. They would keep local authorities at all levels on alert, something the politician constantly demands. But that would be only an additional bonus. The main point is that, at the necessary moment, if circumstances require it, the guardians of the legacy would not allow the system to collapse, fully taking governance into their own hands. A mafia-like organization modeled on Iran’s IRGC is ideally suited to these purposes. And it has already proven its effectiveness in practice.
What better example could there be? It is indeed an effective way to secure the future of one’s legacy after the inevitable departure, the moment of which is inexorably approaching. The question is whether there will be enough time to implement such a large-scale project. But some ideas already appear to be in the air.
The author’s opinions and assessments may not coincide with the position of the Reform.news editorial team