Фото: @RealDonaldTrump
At a recent meeting with Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, Russian President Vladimir Putin effectively issued an ultimatum to Armenia. Why could this precedent and its consequences prove important for Alyaksandr Lukashenka as well?
At the beginning of this year, Nikol Pashinyan announced his intention to move toward European Union membership. Naturally, the plan outlined by Pashinyan could not go unnoticed in Moscow. And when receiving the Armenian prime minister in the Kremlin on April 1, Vladimir Putin made it clear to his partner in the Eurasian Economic Union and the Collective Security Treaty Organization what the consequences of such a choice would be.
Putin said that Moscow viewed the discussion taking place in Armenia about developing relations with the European Union “absolutely calmly.” However, the Russian president’s subsequent remarks clearly demonstrated that this was not the case at all.
Putin told Pashinyan that Armenia would not be able to be in both the European Union and the Eurasian Economic Union at the same time. According to Putin, “this should be obvious, this should be honestly stated in advance, so to speak, before reaching the shore.”
Energy blackmail was also brought into play. Putin noted that gas prices in Europe “exceed $600 per 1,000 cubic metres, while Russia sells gas to Armenia at $177.5 per 1,000 cubic metres. The difference is large, the difference is significant.” Putin also hinted at possible problems with exports of agricultural products produced in Armenia. On the issue of Karabakh, which became one of the key factors in the deterioration of relations between Armenia and its CSTO partners, Putin even proposed “drawing a line under it.”
In addition, the Russian president rather transparently hinted to Pashinyan at the existence of certain pro-Russian forces in Armenia. It is especially important to note that the meeting in the Kremlin took place ahead of important parliamentary elections in Armenia scheduled for June this year. Putin’s remarks can therefore also be viewed as an attempt to influence the outcome of the electoral campaign.
The Armenian prime minister held his ground with dignity. According to Pashinyan, relations with Russia are important for his country. And as long as it is possible to combine the “agendas” of the EU and Russia, the Armenian government is prepared to work on this. “But when the situation reaches the point where some decision has to be made, the citizens of the Republic of Armenia will make that decision.” At the same time, Pashinyan noted that democracy is a “fundamental issue” for his country. According to him, social media in Armenia is “100% free”, and there are no participants in the political process “in remote places”. In relation to modern Russia, this looked like outright political trolling.
But what exactly attracted our attention in the processes now taking place between Armenia and Russia?
Let us return to Minsk, where today Alyaksandr Lukashenka received the new CSTO secretary general, Taalatbek Masadykov. Among other issues, the interlocutors also touched on Armenia. At the same time, Lukashenka adopted an unexpectedly moderate position toward the country.
The Belarusian politician called for being “more correct and careful in working with Armenia”. He suggested that the CSTO secretary general visit Yerevan and speak with the prime minister, the president and the secretary of Armenia’s Security Council in order to find out “their position for the future.”
Lukashenka’s conciliatory approach runs counter to the irritation that Pashinyan and his government clearly provoke in the Kremlin and personally in Vladimir Putin. For some reason, the Belarusian politician does not want to show solidarity with Moscow.
So what could have caused Lukashenka to develop a “special opinion” on Armenia?
It should be recalled that relations between Lukashenka and Pashinyan can hardly be described as cloudless. The deterioration began after the Armenian prime minister said in 2024 that neither he nor other Armenian officials would travel to Belarus while the Belarusian dictator remained in power.
The Armenian prime minister justified his statement by saying that Lukashenka had discussed the 2020 Karabakh war with the president of Azerbaijan before it began, despite being an ally through the CSTO. At the same time, Pashinyan allowed that Armenia’s participation in the CSTO could be unfrozen if Belarus left the organisation or Lukashenka apologised.
Yerevan recalled its ambassador from Minsk.
Against this background, it was striking that Armenia behaved with demonstrative restraint toward Russia, although Putin’s position and actions differed little from Lukashenka’s behaviour. At the same time, Armenia is clearly trying to carefully move away from Russia. This was also demonstrated by the latest meeting between the Armenian and Russian leaders.
And now Lukashenka is closely watching what the consequences of this manoeuvre will be for Armenia. Is Russia ready to use methods against this country as harsh as those used against Ukraine? Or, in its current position, will Moscow not dare to take radical measures, limiting itself to blackmail and economic pressure, which Armenia may be able to withstand under certain conditions? Will the Kremlin interfere in the electoral process in this country, and if so, to what extent and with what degree of success?
All these questions are far from idle for Lukashenka in light of his contacts with the U.S. administration and some kind of “grand bargain,” the scale of which can only be guessed at for now. It is difficult to determine in advance the line that the Kremlin would regard as betrayal and decide to respond to. Or perhaps Lukashenka does not intend to stop at that line at all, but plans to go much further?
Could this be the reason for the Belarusian politician’s caution toward Armenia? He may well be interested in ensuring that this country’s drift toward the West proceeds without major upheaval.
Armenia’s experience will be important for Lukashenka. If Moscow does not dare, or is unable, to force Yerevan back into its sphere of influence, if Armenia manages to escape Russian tutelage, and without major consequences, then for Lukashenka this could become a signal: he can do the same. That would mean Akela has missed. His grip is no longer what it used to be. It is possible to “throw him over.”
The opinions and assessments of the author may not coincide with the opinion of the Reform.news editorial board