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The story of the exchange involving Andrzej Poczobut once again demonstrates how constrained Alyaksandr Lukashenka is. It is doubtful the exchange would have taken place without Moscow’s interest in securing the return of its own agents.
Yesterday, Poland’s intelligence agency and the Belarusian KGB carried out a 5-for-5 exchange. As part of the swap, journalist Andrzej Poczobut was transferred to Poland, having been sentenced by the Belarusian regime in February 2023 to eight years in a high-security penal colony on charges of inciting hatred and calling for sanctions.
Gradually, other participants in the exchange became known. The names of two more were announced by Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, who met Poczobut at the border along with other officials. According to him, “Father Gavel (Polish citizen, Carmelite monk Grzegorz Gavel, accused by the Belarusian regime of espionage — Reform.news note), as well as a Belarusian who cooperated with Polish special services, were released”. The name of the latter was not disclosed at his request. However, Belarusian state television STV reported that he was Polish citizen Tomasz Beroza, sentenced in Belarus in 2023 to 14 years in prison on espionage charges.
It later emerged that two Moldovan intelligence officers detained in Russia were also handed over to Poland. The reasons for their inclusion in the exchange will be addressed later.
Belarus, in turn, received five individuals. Among them was former deputy head of Moldova’s Information and Security Service, convicted of treason and cooperation with the Belarusian KGB and Russia’s GRU, Alexandru Balan, as well as Belarusian Uladzislau Nadzieika, detained in Poland on espionage charges in September last year. In coverage of the exchange, Belarusian propaganda openly referred to them as “our intelligence officers”.
Belarus also received Russian archaeologist Alexander Butyagin, head of the department of ancient archaeology at the Hermitage, detained in Poland in December at Ukraine’s request. Ukraine’s Security Service accused him of conducting excavations in occupied Crimea without permission.
The fourth participant was Russian citizen Nina Popova, detained in Moldova. According to a Gazeta Wyborcza source in Polish intelligence, she is the wife of a GRU officer arrested in Moldova for espionage.
The name of the fifth individual transferred to Belarus was not disclosed, although he appeared briefly in an STV report. According to Gazeta Wyborcza, he is an officer of Kazakhstan’s military intelligence who had been operating in Kyiv under diplomatic cover and was arrested in Poland last year.
Kazakh media reports suggest he may be Anuar Bakibay, assistant military attaché at Kazakhstan’s embassy in Ukraine. As stated by representatives of Kazakh civil society, “Kazakhstan’s special services remain systematically dependent on the Kremlin and often act in the interests of Russian structures, including in intelligence and hybrid operations”.
Thus, the involvement of another country — Kazakhstan — in the negotiations became evident, although Moscow appears to have been the main beneficiary of Bakibay’s release.
According to BelTA, “special services from seven countries were involved” in preparing the exchange. Based on available information, these likely included Poland, Belarus, Russia, the United States, Moldova, Romania and Kazakhstan.
The transfer of two Moldovan intelligence officers detained in Russia appears to have been a condition set by Moldova and Romania for including Alexandru Balan in the exchange. The desire of Belarus — and apparently Russia — to recover their compromised agent necessitated involving Bucharest in the negotiations. Balan held both Moldovan and Romanian citizenship and was detained in Timișoara in September 2025. Gazeta Wyborcza deputy editor-in-chief Bartosz Wieliński said US representatives conducted negotiations with Romania.
In Moldova, Balan was sentenced in absentia to one year and six months in prison for disclosing state secrets. In Romania, he was under house arrest awaiting trial on similar charges. The severity of a potential sentence there is unclear. However, intelligence services — including Russia’s — had a strong interest in extracting him, not least to avoid undermining future recruitment.
Moldova also handed over Nina Popova, who likewise appears to fall within Russia’s sphere of interest rather than Belarus’s.
The exchange took place at the Pererov–Belovezha crossing on the Belarusian-Polish border. However, according to Poland’s minister-coordinator of special services Tomasz Siemoniak, the Polish side was not certain of the operation’s success until the very end and did not rule out unexpected complications.
“In such situations, one can never be sure that nothing will happen, that the president of Belarus will not call and say that we will not proceed — which is exactly what happened last time, when we were very close to an exchange,” Siemoniak said.
He explained that technical arrangements took several days and required bringing individuals from third countries to the border. Their participation increased confidence on the Polish side.
Warsaw also appeared to anticipate possible deception. Siemoniak said the Belarusian side was given a condition: Andrzej Poczobut had to cross the border first.
“Yes, this was our condition, accepted by the other side, so it was obvious for us. No Andrzej Poczobut — no exchange,” he said.
Another key element was that Poczobut crossed the border with a valid Belarusian passport, unlike some other former political prisoners who left with only temporary documents. This may also have been a Polish condition, given the risk that Poczobut might refuse to leave Belarus otherwise. As Prime Minister Donald Tusk wrote on X, one of the journalist’s first questions after release was: “Will I be able to return there?” (to Belarus — Reform.news note).
This does not preclude the possibility that the Belarusian authorities could later revoke his passport, as they have done in other cases. However, crossing the border with valid documents may have been a prerequisite set by Warsaw.
Poland’s leadership had long sought Poczobut’s release. “The exchange at the Polish-Belarusian border was the culmination of a complex diplomatic game lasting two years and full of dramatic twists,” Prime Minister Donald Tusk said.
According to Bartosz Wieliński, Poczobut’s detention and trial became one of the main obstacles in relations between Warsaw and Minsk. The Belarusian side sought to improve ties and reopen border crossings, but Poland’s response remained consistent: Poczobut first.
Polish intelligence sources told Gazeta Wyborcza that the issue of his release had already been raised in 2024 during a Russia-US exchange in which Poland handed over Russian spy Pavel Rubtsov. The United States promised to include Poczobut in a future swap, but this did not materialise, as Moscow declined to negotiate with the outgoing US administration and waited for Donald Trump to return to the White House.
When talks between the new US administration and Alyaksandr Lukashenka intensified last year, Poczobut’s name remained high on Washington’s list of demands.
Wieliński writes that Poczobut was due to be released in October 2025, with Belarusian and Polish services already discussing details. However, Lukashenka halted the process. The official reason cited was Poland’s solidarity with Lithuania, which had closed its border due to smuggling attempts using weather balloons, while Poland postponed reopening crossings.
Sources said the real reason was pressure from Russia and a visit to Minsk by Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov. Moscow may have viewed the exchange as a sign of excessive independence by Minsk.
This time, however, the exchange went ahead because it served Russia’s interests — including the return of its agents and of Butyagin, whose detention had caused significant attention in Russia. This was also acknowledged by Tomasz Siemoniak, who said the outcome was influenced by “the fact that Russia, which often pulls the final strings in Belarus’ case, was also very interested in carrying out this exchange”.
The exchange thus illustrates the Belarusian regime’s deep dependence on the Kremlin. Even the release of some political prisoners appears to require Moscow’s approval. These are the red lines Lukashenka cannot cross, and the deal appears to have been approved only after Russia saw benefits for itself.
These same constraints limit any potential thaw in relations between Belarus and Poland, which has been cautiously discussed in Warsaw.
Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski, at a joint press conference with US envoy John Coale, said that “Poland is always interested in good neighbourly relations with a sovereign, peaceful and developing Belarus” and expressed readiness to “respond with goodwill to gestures of goodwill”.
However, he also pointed to the migration crisis on the Belarusian-Polish border, smuggling via weather balloons, and the fact that Putin boasts about deploying advanced ballistic missile systems and tactical nuclear weapons infrastructure in Belarus. “These are unfriendly actions by Belarus towards us,” he said, effectively outlining key conditions for any improvement in relations.
“Poland is certainly interested in normal relations. But to what extent Lukashenka is independent from Russia, and to what extent he can pursue such a policy?” Siemoniak asked.
The circumstances of Poczobut’s exchange provide a clear answer. The Russian grip on Lukashenka remains too tight for any meaningful thaw with neighbouring countries.
The views and opinions expressed by the author may not coincide with those of the Reform.news editorial team