Lessons From Maduro for Alyaksandr Lukashenka

After the capture of Nicolas Maduro by U.S. special forces, certain conclusions should be drawn by regimes located far beyond the Western Hemisphere, to which the attention of the U.S. administration is now focused. Including the Belarusian one.

First and foremost, there are obvious reasons from now on to listen extremely carefully to the words of Donald Trump. Judging by what is happening, he has decided not to limit himself in the methods used to achieve the desired result.

In this light, for example, the U.S. leader’s request to release all Belarusian political prisoners takes on a different meaning. A request that the Minsk regime fulfilled only to a very small extent. Lukashenka tried to replace the rest with banal flattery toward the U.S. president. But this may prove insufficient. Trump, it seems, does not forget his requests. Nor does he forget those who refuse to fulfill them and try to get in the way of the U.S. president. Maduro tried to defy Trump and refused to step down voluntarily. That is what led to the deplorable consequences. Perhaps it still makes sense to meet the U.S. president halfway and fulfill his request? And to view the willingness of his administration to enter into dialogue not as something owed, but as a favor?

Of course, the chances that the United States will act toward Alyaksandr Lukashenka in the same way as it did toward Maduro are close to zero. An armed seizure and arrest of the Belarusian politician at this stage appears to be a completely implausible scenario. Another matter is that the United States has many other instruments in its arsenal capable of further complicating the already difficult position of the Minsk regime. The United States will not storm Lukashenka’s residence. But it can easily put pressure on his regime on all fronts — in Africa, Latin America, and Asia. Moreover, from now on many politicians in those regions will lose any desire to “anger the old man.” Just in case. And it is quite clear which of the two “old men” they will prefer. As a result, various foreign projects on which Minsk is pinning its hopes may suddenly end up blocked. Simply because one can achieve far more with a kind word and attack helicopters than with a kind word alone. Many around the world will become more cautious and prudent.

So it is better not to “cross” Trump. At least not brazenly. This should also be borne in mind when offering the United States to buy the Nezhinsky Mining and Processing Plant. It is extremely dangerous to assume that the buyer can later be deceived and pushed aside. Explaining the measures taken against Venezuela, Trump, among other things, mentioned property of U.S. oil companies nationalized in the past by that country’s authorities, which he intends to return.

The threat from the other side has also increased significantly. Vladimir Putin has no grounds left to observe even the appearance of decency — Moscow likes to point to the United States in trying to prove that it, too, is allowed a great deal. For now, there seem to be no visible reasons for the Kremlin’s dissatisfaction with Lukashenka. But who knows how things may unfold in the future. In any case, in the eastern direction as well, the room for maneuver for the Belarusian politician is narrowing even further. One must not provoke either Putin or Trump. And only God knows how to slip between these two waterfalls without harming oneself.

But that is not all. The story with Maduro exposes another important problem. It is unlikely that the United States could have carried out such an operation without having agents, or even assistance, in the inner circle of the Venezuelan ruler. And this may create temptation within Lukashenka’s entourage — if his piece is removed from the board, it becomes possible to negotiate and retain power. To negotiate, for example, with Moscow. Or, who knows, with Washington, even under an obligation to carry out reforms. Thus, theoretically, threats arise not only from outside but also from within the system. A part of which has surely grown tired of making do with empty promises that Lukashenka’s current term will definitely be his last. So now one must think — whether to intimidate the entourage or to hand out carrots. By the way, Maduro was guarded not by his own people but by Cubans, who ultimately suffered losses. The Venezuelan politician apparently did not particularly trust his own. Another reason to reflect — would there even be anyone to shoot down helicopters with special forces if they were suddenly to appear in the sky?

Finally, potential partners should also be treated with extreme caution. After all, it is impossible to predict what exactly Nicolas Maduro, taken to the United States, might be able to tell the Americans about joint Belarusian-Venezuelan projects. The close friendship between the two regimes began back under Maduro’s predecessor, Hugo Chavez. And judging by information that has entered the public domain, it was extremely beneficial for both sides. And the fact that the Venezuelan direction was personally overseen by Lukashenka’s special aide Viktar Sheiman suggests that certain aspects of this close cooperation were something the sides preferred not to publicize. Maduro is undoubtedly aware of what was going on. So the U.S. government may end up with a wide range of information at its disposal. Information that can be used in different ways. If not now, then when the need arises.

However, in this specific case, it is already too late to learn lessons. All that remains is to wait and hope for the best. While firmly memorizing the key security rule актуализирован by Maduro’s fate: with Putin on one side and Trump on the other, it is better to keep one’s tongue behind one’s teeth. And one’s hands in plain sight.