A Real Deal or a Dud? Trump’s Diesel-for-Potash Deal and Lukashenka’s Failure
Reform.news Editorial Team · 12 October 2026, 18:34
https://reform.news/en/a-real-deal-or-a-dud-trump-s-diesel-for-potash-deal-and-lukashenka-s-failure/US negotiators are trying to salvage the midterm elections. Against the backdrop of deals between Moscow and Washington, as well as information leaked to the media about Belarusian potash supplies, the so-called negotiating track pursued by Aliaksandr Lukashenka with the United States looks very different.
Free Fuel
Last Friday, Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin held a phone call. Afterwards, the US president announced that the two sides had agreed on supplies of Russian diesel fuel.
Reports said that under the agreement, Russia had committed to immediately supplying 300,000 tonnes of fuel to global markets, followed by another 500,000 tonnes in November and an additional 1 million tonnes in December. On Saturday, October 10, the Russian government partially lifted the ban on diesel exports that had been in force since January 31, 2026.
Although Ukrainian strikes have reportedly knocked out up to 45% of Russia’s oil-refining capacity, triggering the most severe petrol shortage since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has managed to avoid a serious diesel shortage. Most cars in Russia run on petrol. Diesel, used mainly by trucks and heavy machinery, has traditionally been available in surplus.
Russia produces summer and winter grades of diesel fuel, designed for use at temperatures above minus 5°C and down to minus 35°C, respectively. In autumn, after the harvest is complete, the country switches to winter-grade fuel. The remaining stocks of summer-grade diesel are barely used on the domestic market until spring and can therefore be redirected for export.
Taken together, these factors mean that the promised diesel supply volumes will not pose a serious challenge for Russia.
At the same time, the Financial Times reports that experts doubt Trump’s deal with Moscow will provide significant relief to diesel consumers in the United States or elsewhere in the world. Even if Russia exports half a million tonnes next month, that would cover less than 4% of global demand for this type of fuel.
A Lifeline for Trump
For the US president, the deal with Moscow appears to be more of a PR move than a tool for addressing the fuel crisis on global markets, which has been caused by Washington’s military campaign against Iran and difficulties with oil supplies through the Strait of Hormuz.
Trump appears to need someone to blame for the fuel crisis and to shift responsibility away from himself ahead of the US midterm elections scheduled for November 3 this year, in which Republicans risk losing their majorities in both chambers of Congress.
As a result, Ukraine has become a casualty of the US election race and Trump’s attempts to shift blame for his own miscalculations. This explains the accusations directed at Kyiv and Volodymyr Zelenskyy: in Trump’s view, Ukrainian strikes on Russian oil refineries have contributed to rising fuel prices in the United States. Trump decided to strike a deal with Russia on diesel exports after Zelenskyy ignored half a dozen requests from Washington to stop attacks on Russian refineries.
Trump’s erratic shifts — one moment signing the Russia and Iran Sanctions Act of 2026, sponsored by Lindsey Graham and passed by Congress, which gives him the power to impose tariffs on countries buying energy from Russia, and the next striking a diesel deal with the Kremlin — point to the absence of a coherent strategy for ending the Russian-Ukrainian war. Meanwhile, US presidential envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner are grasping at whatever options they can find, hoping to achieve some result that Trump can boast about on Truth Social. The impression is that the American negotiators’ main task is simply to rescue the US president’s reputation.
Yesterday, Trump announced on his social media platform that an agreement between Russia and Ukraine to halt strikes on energy infrastructure would take effect “immediately”. However, according to Volodymyr Zelenskyy, Russia attacked a Ukrainian energy facility after the US president’s post. Today, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov effectively contradicted Trump’s claims, saying that the Russian side had no information about an energy truce and that contacts on the issue were still ongoing.
Trump’s diesel deal has failed to win support even from some fellow Republicans. On Saturday, Pennsylvania Republican Representative Brian Fitzpatrick pledged to seek a vote in the House of Representatives to block purchases of Russian oil.
Depending on the outcome of the US vote on November 3, we could find ourselves in an entirely different reality in just a month. Donald Trump could become a “lame duck”. For now, the world is holding its breath as it awaits the verdict of American voters.
The Potash U-Turn
As for the regime in Minsk, Washington appears not to take Lukashenka seriously at all.
According to The New York Times, US negotiators Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner proposed allowing exports of Belarusian potash fertilisers as part of a package of economic incentives intended to persuade Moscow to agree to a limited ceasefire in Ukraine.
The article does not specify which restrictions were to be lifted or under what conditions. The authors also do not give the exact date when the potash initiative was discussed or say whether representatives of Minsk took part.
But the very fact that the idea was discussed with the Russians as part of a package of economic incentives for Moscow casts doubt on whether US negotiators regard Lukashenka as an independent figure with whom they need to negotiate.
The Belarusian politician has recently been acting as though he has a separate negotiating track with Washington. But, as we can see, Trump’s envoys ultimately decided to discuss major issues with Putin rather than with him.
Remember when, on September 11, Lukashenka announced that supplies of potash fertilisers to the United States had begun? At the same time, he complained that the available volumes had already been contracted, leaving enough for just one “ship to be loaded”. Lukashenka also mentioned the lack of spare volumes of potash fertilisers for supply to Western countries during a meeting with State Customs Committee Chairman Uladzimir Arlouski.
But what if the order to load that single ship came from the Kremlin? Perhaps it was intended to let Trump claim that American farmers were getting fertilisers at “favourable prices”, with their votes set to matter in the midterm elections. And perhaps the Belarusian politician had no choice but to salute and carry out the order, despite the volumes already being contracted. In that case, the entire potash story, like Russian diesel supplies, is little more than a pretext for Trump’s verbal interventions — an opportunity to post a triumphant message on Truth Social. The Belarusian-American potash saga could end there.
If so, Lukashenka’s “negotiating track” with the United States takes on an entirely different hue. All the politician’s grand ideas about selling the Nezhinsky Mining and Processing Plant to the Americans and building a nitrogen fertiliser complex look like unsuccessful attempts to attract at least some attention. Those attempts have been casually trampled by Kushner and Witkoff, who have thrown all these proposals into the furnace of negotiations with Putin. This amounts to a complete failure for Lukashenka. It turns out that he has no independent negotiating track with the United States at all. Moscow is pulling his strings.
John Coale did not have enough political clout to help Lukashenka. Now, even if the US Senate confirms Coale as special envoy for hostage affairs, his involvement in Belarus-related matters will very likely diminish considerably.
It therefore appears that Lukashenka’s negotiating track with the United States may turn out to be a dud. There is nothing behind it but hopes and tentative “gestures of goodwill”, permitted by Moscow, in the hope of getting something in return — perhaps a hypothetical meeting with Trump, perhaps the $40 million held at Citibank, perhaps the lifting of sanctions on Lakokraska and Bellesbumprom. The Belarusian politician is powerless to change this state of affairs, regardless of the outcome of the US midterm elections.
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The views and assessments expressed by the author may not reflect those of the Reform.news editorial team.