{"id":508301,"date":"2026-01-08T20:38:34","date_gmt":"2026-01-08T17:38:34","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/reform.news\/?p=508301"},"modified":"2026-01-08T22:52:30","modified_gmt":"2026-01-08T19:52:30","slug":"dialogue-from-the-united-transitional-cabinet-and-the-system-s-survival-instinct","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/reform.news\/en\/dialogue-from-the-united-transitional-cabinet-and-the-system-s-survival-instinct","title":{"rendered":"Dialogue From the United Transitional Cabinet and the System\u2019s Survival Instinct"},"content":{"rendered":"
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Today, the United Transitional Cabinet of Belarus once again called on the Belarusian regime to enter into dialogue. The occasion for the renewed appeal was the arrest of Nicolas Maduro<\/b> in Venezuela. And indeed, a transition and subsequent dialogue are essentially the only realistic and, most importantly, bloodless way to preserve Belarus and its independence. Few would like the alternative scenarios.<\/p>\n

In its statement, the United Transitional Cabinet stressed that a roundtable to overcome the political crisis is a means of avoiding a collapse of statehood. \u201cMaduro refused dialogue with the opposition, chose repression instead of legitimacy, considered the security forces his impregnable shield \u2014 and made a grave mistake. As a result, Venezuela\u2019s fate will now largely depend on external factors,\u201d<\/i> the statement said.<\/p>\n

Calling on the regime to engage in dialogue, the United Transitional Cabinet emphasized that \u201corganizing a roundtable to overcome the political crisis in Belarus\u201d<\/i> remains \u201cthe only means of preventing a collapse of statehood.\u201d<\/i><\/p>\n

And such a collapse is quite possible in the longer term. Let us assume that a power transition in Belarus never takes place and that Alyaksandr Lukashenka<\/b> remains in power for a number of additional years. Let us assume that he even manages to seat a successor on the throne and for some time control and support him. But there are no charismatic figures either within the Lukashenka family or in his close circle. And there is hardly anywhere for them to come from: a politician is unlikely to hand over power to a strong personality \u2014 such a figure cannot be controlled. Therefore, with a high degree of probability, either a family member will end up at the helm (most likely, this role is envisioned for his younger son, Mikalai Lukashenka<\/strong>), or a temporary, deliberately weak and manageable figure. The task of such a figure would be to serve as a transitional stage before power is passed within the same family. This is roughly how Lukashenka himself appears to see this process, judging by current developments.<\/p>\n

However, Belarus is dealing with a clearly pronounced personalist regime. And, as already noted, there is no one to firmly pick up the \u201cfallen banner.\u201d As a result, there is a significant risk that after the departure of the regime\u2019s architect, the transition will not be smooth. Especially if that departure is unexpected or relatively rapid. Clan wars could well begin, and the remaining \u201clesser heads\u201d of the dragon, deprived of the main one, may start tearing each other apart for coveted power. The outcome will largely depend on who is the first to give the order to neutralize competitors. From there, it is not far to large-scale bloodshed. At the same time, many within the system itself risk ending up \u201cunder the knife\u201d: those who interfere, those who have something to lose, and those who simply fail to orient themselves in time.<\/p>\n

Nearby is Russia, which would immediately intervene, take under its wing whoever it considers most useful. Most likely, this would be someone from among pro-Russian security officials. It would help its prot\u00e9g\u00e9 consolidate power, including through force. As a result, the risk is great that Belarus, even while retaining formal attributes of independence, would turn into a kind of analogue of Chechnya \u2014 an entity fully controlled by Moscow, whose ruler is allowed to terrorize the local population in exchange for loyalty to the center. That is the collapse of statehood. This overdue-transition scenario is, of course, not the only possible one. But it is among the most likely.<\/p>\n

Even more doubtful is the ability of democratic forces \u2014 even if they were to return to the country at the moment of such a transition \u2014 to oppose the warring clans with anything effective in order to seize power. And then to hold on to it.<\/p>\n

It is not a guarantee, but at least a chance to avoid such a disastrous scenario for the country that the national dialogue called for by the United Transitional Cabinet provides. Perhaps only such a dialogue makes it possible to develop conditions acceptable to various interested groups for a more or less stable transition to the next stage of the system\u2019s development. This was the same principle behind the famous Round Table talks between the authorities and the opposition in Poland in 1989. On the one hand, they were not an unconditional victory for Solidarity \u2014 the system retained many posts and powers. On the other, the agreements helped avoid the worst-case scenario and still allowed, albeit gradually, a transition toward democracy.<\/p>\n

Such compromises could also prove useful for Belarus. It is too difficult, if not impossible, to dismantle overnight a system built over years and immediately construct a new one on its ruins, while ensuring uninterrupted functioning amid inevitable chaos. A transitional period is needed \u2014 the very transition whose most painless possible passage depends in part on dialogue. The result should be acceptance by all sides of the agreements reached. In other words, acceptance of the framework of a future deal, whatever connotations this term may have acquired recently. This is the value of the United Transitional Cabinet\u2019s proposal.<\/p>\n

It can be assumed that many people who today remain part of the existing system fully understand the importance of such agreements. Perhaps the main opponent of dialogue within the system today is one person \u2014 Lukashenka himself. Despite the fact that dialogue could prove salvational even for him personally, he understands that it would also represent his personal defeat. And so it turns out that any alternative processes can begin only without Lukashenka.<\/p>\n

But \u201cwithout\u201d does not necessarily mean \u201cafter.\u201d The ball is on the system\u2019s side of the field, and it too is interested in survival and in minimizing the consequences of impending shocks. It too is interested in a bloodless transition. And the longer it is postponed, the more nervous the system\u2019s representatives themselves become. At some point, the instinct of self-preservation may well overcome fear. That is why a return pass from that side can be expected. At the moment when many factors come together \u2014 political \u201cweather,\u201d trust between players on different teams, support from the stands, and referees who look away at the right time.<\/p>\n

This is when it is worth returning to what the United Transitional Cabinet begins its appeal with \u2014 the Maduro case. A man whose unenviable fate, it appears, was decided behind his back. By his own associates. The hint is quite transparent.<\/p>\n

***<\/strong><\/p>\n

The opinions and assessments expressed by the author may not coincide with the position of the Reform.news editorial board.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Today, the United Transitional Cabinet of Belarus once again called on the Belarusian regime to enter into dialogue. The occasion for the renewed appeal was the arrest of Nicolas Maduro in Venezuela. And indeed, a transition and subsequent dialogue are essentially the only realistic and, most importantly, bloodless way to preserve Belarus and its independence. […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":508300,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_sharing_image":{"poster":"https:\/\/reform.news\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/01\/69600b05a39d8.jpg","width":1200,"height":630,"template":"691142dd","mode":"auto"},"_sharing_image_fieldset":{"dTVKfmI95PYT":"Dialogue From the United Transitional Cabinet and the System\u2019s Survival Instinct"},"footnotes":""},"categories":[142376,142339,142338],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-508301","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-comment","category-main","category-news"],"wps_subtitle":"","permalink_manager":null,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/reform.news\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/508301","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/reform.news\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/reform.news\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/reform.news\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/reform.news\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=508301"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/reform.news\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/508301\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/reform.news\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/508300"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/reform.news\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=508301"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/reform.news\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=508301"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/reform.news\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=508301"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}