Иллюстрация: фото president.gov.by, обработанное ИИ
Aliaksandr Lukashenka has appointed Pavel Muraveika deputy head of his Administration. The politician suggested that the appointment would be linked “to strengthening some component of the security services.” However, other, much less conventional explanations for this personnel decision can also be considered.
Perhaps Lukashenka has already placed the comma in this subheading. Six years have passed since the events of 2020, yet the key figures in the security agencies who helped Lukashenka retain power remain in their positions. This includes the army, but primarily the Interior Ministry and the KGB. Lukashenka is effectively indebted to those who crushed the protests and continue to carry out harsh repression to this day.
The situation is twofold. On the one hand, the security agencies are headed by trusted, vetted people who are deeply implicated in bloodshed alongside Lukashenka. On the other, one might assume that the politician is no longer entirely comfortable with this arrangement. He does not want to remain indebted to the security services forever. They are, so to speak, becoming too powerful. They expect special treatment for their “services” and for a constant stream of benefits to come their way in return for their “work” — control over a number of profitable businesses, the opportunity to establish their own commercial entities “under the protection” of the agencies they head, and other ways of enriching themselves that are not provided for in their contracts.
It would therefore make sense to replace them with equally trusted and vetted people who are less ambitious. People to whom the politician owes no personal debt. People who would not dare claim a debt for 2020 and therefore consider themselves “the chosen few” and untouchable. Especially since time is passing and a new generation of personnel has already come of age.
In this light, one can envisage preparations for a purge of the security services’ leadership. This would not necessarily involve arrests — rather, they would likely be quietly sent into retirement. Those who are still too young to retire could be transferred to other positions.
Let us assume that State Secretary of the Security Council Aliaksandr Valfovich has been tasked with overseeing these purges. It is difficult to overlook the growing role of the Security Council. One can recall the large-scale inspection of the Armed Forces launched in January this year, conducted over the heads of the Defence Ministry and General Staff, as well as Lukashenka’s recent remark about strengthening the coordinating role of the Security Council’s State Secretariat and the state secretary personally within the KGB.
Now the Security Council’s position has also been strengthened within Lukashenka’s Administration. The post of deputy head has gone to Valfovich’s longtime associate — now former Chief of the General Staff and First Deputy Defence Minister, General Muraveika.
Pavel Muraveika’s career is closely linked to Aliaksandr Valfovich’s professional moves. In 2008, they graduated concurrently from the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. When appointing Muraveika Chief of the General Staff in 2024, Aliaksandr Lukashenka specifically emphasized their service together with Valfovich.
Muraveika became Deputy Chief of the General Staff and Head of the Main Operations Directorate in 2013. In January 2014, the directorate was headed by Aleh Bialakoneu. From 2018, his first deputy was Aliaksandr Valfovich. In January 2020, Valfovich became Chief of the General Staff, while Muraveika remained his deputy.
After becoming head of the Security Council in January 2021, Valfovich brought Muraveika over as his first deputy. In 2024, Chief of the General Staff Viktar Hulevich was discharged into the reserve upon reaching retirement age. The vacant post went not to his first deputy, Andrei Matsievich, as might have seemed logical, but to General Muraveika. It is possible that Valfovich was also behind this appointment, having managed to convince Lukashenka of the value of his first deputy.
Now Valfovich’s right-hand man, Muraveika, has also taken up a position in Lukashenka’s Administration.
Given that no information has been published about deputies to Lukashenka’s Administration who were dismissed or transferred to other positions, it can be assumed that the new post of deputy “for military affairs” was created specifically for Muraveika.
It is also noteworthy that after Viktar Lukashenka was relieved of his position as presidential aide for national security in 2021, the post remained vacant. The Security Council took over matters that had previously fallen within his remit. Muraveika is obviously not Viktar, but to some extent the vacant role of security aide may now be filled.
Explaining his appointment, the newly appointed deputy himself said that “this strengthens the Administration as part of creating a comprehensive and complete picture of ongoing processes, with the aim of ensuring high-quality governance of the country and providing the president with all the information necessary to make strategic decisions.”
He then launched into lengthy remarks about security during a “period of rapid economic development and large-scale social development.” But it seems that General Muraveika is not telling the whole story.
Aliaksandr Lukashenka himself explained Muraveika’s appointment as reflecting his desire to have “an alternative, competing point of view” on “the situation in our security units.”
Addressing the new Chief of the General Staff, Uladzimir Bely, the politician said that from now on he “will be under the president’s close scrutiny, and perhaps even pressure, not only through the State Secretariat but also through the Presidential Administration.” The same is surely true of the Defence Ministry and other security agencies. The mention of “pressure” may also point to purges in the making.
When making the appointment, the politician said that Muraveika should now be “independent of everyone,” including the State Secretariat of the Security Council and the Defence Ministry. But this may be no more than an attempt to disguise the appointment, conceal the close Valfovich–Muraveika relationship and obscure the pair’s real tasks.
The “alternative point of view” of Valfovich and Muraveika may well involve bringing new people into the security agencies and pushing out the “old guard,” to whom Lukashenka does not want to remain indebted. If so, a purge may be imminent. Many senior security officials should prepare for forced retirement.
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The views and assessments expressed by the author may not reflect those of the Reform.news editorial team.