Иллюстрация: карикатура о Рижском мире, wikipedia.org
Who should and who can represent Belarus in potential negotiations on ending the war? These are two completely different questions. The worst possible outcome would be for Russia to represent our country’s interests once again. In an ideal world, Belarusian interests should be represented not by the regime but by its political opponents. However, the world is far from ideal. Still, if the negotiation process does gain momentum, both the democratic forces and Aliaksandr Lukashenka may still have a chance to take part in it in one form or another. And each of the possible scenarios can and should be used to advance our interests.
It is still difficult to predict where the negotiations will lead. Will the outcome be Budapest 2.0, Helsinki 2.0, Minsk 3.0, or something else entirely? The maximalist demands Russia continues to put forward cast doubt on whether the negotiations can develop into anything constructive at all. But let us assume that they do. And that the agenda will cover not only the cessation of hostilities but also the post-war arrangements for the region. In other words, issues that directly concern our country.
One thing is beyond dispute: the worst possible scenario for Belarus would be a repeat of the 1921 Treaty of Riga, when representatives of our country were excluded from the negotiations. This meant they had no say and no opportunity to influence the terms of the agreement being prepared. The interests of Belarusians were “represented” at the talks by a delegation from Soviet Russia. Naturally, that delegation prioritised its own goals and objectives.
The problem is that a similar scenario cannot be ruled out today. The Kremlin may either decide to bring Lukashenka into the negotiations to gain an additional voice in its support, or leave him out in order not to loosen its grip on the Belarusian regime.
Remember how, in March 2025, Vladimir Putin pretended not to understand a question about Belarus’s interests in possible peace negotiations. According to the Russian president, “taking Belarus’s interests into account is fully in line with the national interests of the Russian Federation.”
That formulation could conceal just about anything.
Another of Putin’s statements at the time also sounded ambiguous:
“Within the framework of the Union State, we proceed from the fact that we have a common foreign policy concept. Our foreign ministries work very closely together on all international platforms,” he said.
His words can be interpreted in different ways. Including this one: if Lukashenka and Russia have a “common foreign policy concept”, there is no need to provide the Belarusian politician with a separate chair at the negotiating table. The Russians will “take his interests into account”. Once again, according to their own understanding of what is right and what is wrong.
Lukashenka played along with Putin at the time, saying that he was not particularly eager to go anywhere. Instead, “a person close to us, our partner — the Russian Federation — will be at the negotiations. And it knows our interests and will under no circumstances yield or retreat from them.” It looked as though the Belarusian politician was prepared to delegate his representation to the Kremlin.
Of course, Lukashenka was not being entirely sincere. We have written more than once that getting a seat at the negotiating table, even if it is just an extra chair, has been and remains the Belarusian politician’s fondest dream. For him, it would be an ideal opportunity to gain legitimacy, stay in power and secure guarantees for his safety.
Following the resumption of trilateral contacts between US, Ukrainian and Russian delegations in the UAE, the Belarusian regime once again stepped up efforts to remind the world of its existence. These included an interview with Lukashenka published by the French outlet Le Point and an appeal by his press secretary, Natallia Eismant, to the Belarusian roots of one of Washington’s chief negotiators, Donald Trump’s son-in-law, Jared Kushner. And the more realistic the prospect of reaching some kind of agreement becomes, the more actively the Belarusian regime will continue trying to force its way to the negotiating table.
Personally, I very much like the principle of “Nothing about Belarusians without Belarusians” and the “10-Point Programme for Real Change” proposed by the National Anti-Crisis Management (NAM).
If the Belarusian democratic forces managed to secure a seat at the negotiating table, that would be the ideal outcome. It would also offer a chance to defend, at least to some extent, the interests of the Belarusian people rather than those of the regime.
But, like any ideal scenario, this plan seems unlikely. The main reason is that it would not receive support from a significant number of potential participants in the negotiations.
And the issue here is by no means the regime, which, for obvious reasons, would be categorically opposed to such a turn of events.
Moscow would be equally firmly opposed. It has little need for Lukashenka’s participation, let alone that of the Belarusian democratic forces. It is difficult even to imagine what concessions the other side would have to make for the Kremlin to agree to this. Moreover, from Russia’s perspective, the participation of Belarusian democratic forces in the negotiations could set a “bad example” for its own opposition.
Ukraine has probably been the most outspoken opponent of Lukashenka’s participation in the negotiations. But for Kyiv, the Belarusian democratic forces are more of a situational ally than a political force whose presence at the negotiating table Ukrainians would be prepared to fight for. If Ukraine concludes that the war can indeed end on reasonably acceptable terms, it may well agree both to Lukashenka’s participation and to Belarus being entirely absent from the talks. The democratisation of Belarus would undoubtedly benefit Kyiv. But the war has been going on for almost five years, and it is unlikely that liberalising its northern neighbour is a priority for Ukrainians. If it happens, great. If not, that will do too.
Donald Trump and his administration are interested in ending the war as soon as possible and reaching some kind of agreement. Most of the details, by and large, are of secondary importance to them. And the more negotiators there are at the table, each with their own interests, the harder it becomes to reach an agreement. This applies to Lukashenka as well as to all other potential participants. The likely scenario is this: if, for example, Moscow makes Lukashenka’s participation a condition, Washington will not object, as long as the process gets moving. As for the democratic camp opposed to the Belarusian politician, the Americans have no interest in it at all in the context of negotiations on the war.
The only parties that seem willing to support the Belarusian democratic forces in their ambitions are the Europeans. But they themselves are hardly welcome participants in the process. Russia is clearly interested in a trilateral format involving the US and Ukraine, seeking to reach an agreement behind the EU’s back. US presidential envoy Jared Kushner said after the talks in Abu Dhabi that the Kremlin had agreed to expand the format and include European partners in the negotiations. But three days ago, Putin’s press secretary Dmitry Peskov effectively walked back that statement, saying that Moscow still had to learn the Europeans’ position on the matter and decide whether their participation would be appropriate. It cannot be ruled out that EU representatives will have to fight their way into the negotiations themselves to address their own vital concerns. Against this backdrop, support for the Belarusian democratic movement in the context of the talks could easily take a back seat.
And in a US-Ukraine-Russia configuration, there appears to be no place for Belarus.
This tangle of competing interests and contradictions makes the participation of Belarusian democratic forces in the negotiations extremely unlikely. Lukashenka has slightly better chances, since his presence, so to speak, could prove an acceptable compromise for all sides.
Nevertheless, there are other options, perhaps not as ideal but still workable, to ensure that Belarusian interests are not left out of the process if the parties agree to expand it.
An interesting idea has been put forward by Pavel Latushka, Deputy Head of the United Transitional Cabinet and head of the National Anti-Crisis Management. He spoke about a proposal to appoint a European Union special envoy for Belarus, who could represent the interests of the Belarusian democratic forces in international negotiations.
In other words, these matters would be entrusted not to Lukashenka or Moscow, but to an experienced European politician. This envoy could be backed by an expert group made up of representatives of the Belarusian democratic forces. Even if they were not physically present at the venue, they could advise the envoy behind the scenes on important details. The politician could then speak on their behalf, defending Belarusian interests alongside those of EU countries. At the very least, the envoy could seek guarantees of Belarusian sovereignty and a ban on Russia using our country’s territory, airspace and infrastructure for military purposes.
This option seems more realistic than the direct participation of our democratic forces in the negotiations. Even if the regime takes part, it would provide an opportunity to convey an alternative perspective to the negotiating parties and create a chance for that perspective to be taken into account when an agreement is drafted.
I will put forward an idea that some may find controversial. It would be better for Lukashenka to represent Belarus at the negotiations than for Belarus’s seat to remain empty.
But the politician’s participation in the talks can and should be made conditional on a number of requirements. Especially if we avoid putting forward entirely maximalist demands. A significant number of the same 10 points proposed by the National Anti-Crisis Management could prove to be the price the regime is willing to pay for taking part in the negotiations. For example, ending repression and releasing all political prisoners. Repealing regulations that restrict the rights of Belarusians abroad, while restoring consular services, passport issuance and the right to vote from abroad. And perhaps even launching a Belarusian Round Table on overcoming the political crisis and preserving the state’s sovereignty and independence, bringing together the current authorities exercising power in Belarus and the democratic forces, with international mediation.
That would unquestionably be better than nothing. There is little reason to be optimistic about the effectiveness of such a round table, since even if the regime agrees to hold it, it is unlikely to take the process seriously. But you never know.
These demands could be supported by both the Europeans and even the United States. Possibly by Moscow too, if we assume that it is genuinely interested in negotiations rather than simply dragging out the process by pretending to negotiate.
The world is not perfect, and it is rarely possible to achieve everything at once. But getting the regime to meet at least some of the democratic forces’ demands would already be a considerable achievement. And in preparations for the negotiations, some concessions from Lukashenka may well be possible if his interests are taken into account. Step by step is still better than standing still.
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The opinions and assessments expressed by the author may not reflect those of the Reform.news editorial team.