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Franak Viačorka, an adviser to Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, has described preparations for confidential consultations with representatives of Aliaksandr Lukashenka in 2020–2021. The failure of these talks, which never took place, raises questions about how interested the regime might be in anything similar under current circumstances — and who would be willing to engage in serious negotiations with it, and for what purpose.
Viačorka provided a detailed timeline of events and explained how the Tsikhanouskaya team approached preparations for possible negotiations. He described the involvement of senior European politicians and influential organisations, including then-Austrian Chancellor Sebastian Kurz and Foreign Minister Alexander Schallenberg, as well as diplomat Martin Sajdik, who worked with the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD), an organisation specialising in confidential mediation in conflicts. Through this channel, Tsikhanouskaya’s team tried to establish contact with Lukashenka’s representatives and bring them into the consultations.
Former diplomat Andrei Bushyla may have referred to contacts with the Austrian Embassy in Minsk in an interview with Nastassia Rouda, when he recalled being asked to pass on a message inviting Belarusian Foreign Minister Uladzimir Makei to Vienna.
In November 2020, discussions were held in the Austrian capital, Vienna, on possible formats for negotiations, as well as international guarantees and the participation of Russia and the European Union. Following the meeting, the organisers proposed establishing a permanent dialogue mechanism. Representatives of the Belarusian authorities did not take part in the meeting. It is worth noting that the Belarusian side of the discussions included not only Tsikhanouskaya’s team, but also Valery and Veranika Tsapkala, as well as representatives of Pavel Latushka’s team.
In spring 2021, Tsikhanouskaya’s team presented the Austrian side with a plan for a peaceful settlement. At the first stage, Viačorka says, the proposal was to hold consultations without preconditions with representatives appointed by Lukashenka. Political negotiations would follow at the second stage.
“The idea is simple: if the regime does not want public negotiations, we can start with closed expert consultations, without cameras or loud statements,” Viačorka said, describing the position of Belarusian democratic forces.
The Austrian government began preparing a high-level conference. According to Viačorka, the draft programme envisaged the participation of representatives of the Belarusian authorities, to whom Austria sent invitations. Invitations were sent to Foreign Minister Uladzimir Makei and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov. Some of the discussions were planned to take place behind closed doors.
Schallenberg, who had by then replaced Kurz as Austrian chancellor, announced an international conference on the “Belarusian issue”. It was scheduled for November 22, 2021.
However, at a joint press conference with Lavrov on November 10, Makei called the Vienna initiative “a pointless undertaking” and “an unfriendly step”. The minister announced that “no official representatives of the Belarusian side will take part in it”.
As a result, the conference went ahead without representatives of Lukashenka, and direct negotiations with the regime never began.
One revealing detail, Viačorka writes, is that Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov also criticised the proposed dialogue format. According to Austrian MP Ewa Ernst-Dziedzic, “the Belarusian authorities initially showed interest, but decided not to participate after Russia reacted negatively”.
By late autumn 2021, it was clear that the Belarusian regime had survived. Support from Moscow was one of the key factors. Only a few months remained before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The invasion plans had already been drawn up, and Lukashenka’s Belarus had been assigned a role that is now well known. Under these circumstances, the Kremlin had no interest in Lukashenka engaging in dialogue either with the West or with Belarusian democratic forces. By then, the politician had tied himself to Russia in order to remain in power. Moscow needed a loyal vassal — and it had not secured one simply to let him off the leash.
Initially, Moscow appeared to attach certain conditions to its support for Lukashenka, such as amendments to the Belarusian Constitution followed by early presidential elections. The Belarusian politician was effectively forced to pledge this in front of Russian propagandists’ cameras. But after the full-scale invasion began, all those plans were abandoned.
Without Russian support, Lukashenka might have been forced to enter negotiations and make certain compromises. But that remains speculation. The fact is that by autumn 2021, neither Russia nor Lukashenka himself, who had grown more confident, needed negotiations. With the Kremlin’s backing, he was not particularly intimidated even by the sectoral sanctions imposed by the EU and the United States at the time. They were unpleasant, but Russia was prepared to pay for the services it received. The regime also managed to stabilise the situation inside Belarus through large-scale repression.
Is there any indication that the regime’s position has changed and that, under current circumstances, it might be willing to engage in dialogue with its political opponents?
The key factor in assessing the situation appears to have been, and remains, the issue of the transfer of power. This is a challenge the regime will inevitably face over the next decade. When the moment of truth comes, Lukashenka wants to be certain that everything goes according to plan and without complications. This is one of the reasons why repression in the country continues unabated: the field must not merely be cleared — no new shoots that could pose even a hypothetical threat must be allowed to emerge.
This explains not only the regime’s vindictiveness but also the deportation of all political prisoners who are relatively well known and influential. The farther they are from their homeland, the more comfortable the regime feels. In this light, hopes of returning to the country in the near future and engaging in any kind of activity there appear illusory. The regime has learned from the mistakes of previous, even highly conditional, “liberalisation” efforts and is unlikely to want to repeat them.
Against this backdrop, the ongoing repression in the country should be viewed not only as a means of holding hostages for future bargaining, but also as a tool for keeping society in a state of permanent fear. The scale of repression could theoretically decline somewhat over time, but there is little reason to hope that it will be brought to a complete end.
It is also clear that entering into negotiations with democratic forces — regardless of who represents them — would be tantamount to defeat for Lukashenka. All sides, without exception, would interpret it as a sign of weakness. The politician might consider such a scenario only with a knife to his throat.
There are perhaps two factors that are causing the regime some discomfort. The first is that Russia has still failed to achieve its objectives in the war, which both Moscow and, presumably, Minsk initially expected to be a “lightning” campaign. However, Russia is still far from defeat, which would also mean defeat for Lukashenka. Any intermediate outcome, meanwhile, leaves the Belarusian regime a chance, with a bit of luck, to slip through the cracks.
Yet, just as it was five years ago, the Kremlin has no interest in giving Lukashenka an opportunity to pursue an independent course. The Belarusian politician’s room for manoeuvre is limited, and his fear of Putin is far greater than any fear of the West and its sanctions — which, moreover, he can try to circumvent.
The second factor is the sanctions themselves. It would be good for the regime to have them lifted, but they are unlikely to be a matter of existential importance. The regime has learned how to circumvent them, and Russia continues to provide some support. Official Minsk is ready to discuss lifting the sanctions, but on its own terms. Lukashenka set those out in a speech at the Minsk International Conference on Eurasian Security. He is ready to “turn the page” if the West admits defeat. Nothing more, but nothing less. Yes, this is partly bravado. But the fact that Russia remains a reliable rear base gives the politician grounds for such posturing. Moreover, both Moscow and Minsk are presumably pinning their hopes on election campaigns in several major European countries next year. Depending on the outcome, the positions of their new leaders towards Russia and its ally could change.
Lukashenka’s Belarus continues to support Russia in the war. Provocations are periodically carried out from the territory of our country, ranging from attempts by groups of migrants to cross the border to weather balloons and damage to surveillance systems along the border of an EU and NATO member state. The EU might be willing to consider lifting sanctions, either fully or partially. But today, Western democracies are most likely preoccupied above all with security threats along their eastern borders and the risk of further escalation of the war.
The West would probably be willing to discuss security issues. But what would be the point of talking to Lukashenka if, as happened in November 2021, Moscow ultimately responds with a resounding “no”, rendering all efforts futile? It seems that until Europe has a clear understanding that Lukashenka is capable of significantly changing his foreign policy, no meaningful dialogue can be expected. And here, as before, everything comes down to Putin and the Kremlin.
Today, State Secretary of the Security Council Aliaksandr Valfovich complained that the meeting between the foreign ministers of Poland and Belarus, Radosław Sikorski and Maksim Ryzhankou, on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly had not led to the follow-up Minsk had hoped for. The reason, of course, is that Warsaw is waiting for concrete steps from Minsk — steps that Minsk cannot take without Moscow’s consent. Consequently, there are no signs that conditions for meaningful dialogue with Europeans will emerge.
And they are unlikely to emerge before the war ends.
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The author’s opinions and assessments may not reflect the views of Reform.news.